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ABSTRACT
Charitable bequests are an important source of philanthropic support.  Unlike bequests to
children which can be taxed at a maximum statutory rate of 0.55, such transfers are exempt from
estate taxation.  Thus, by lowering the price of charitable giving, the estate tax may influence the
disposition of terminal wealth.  In this paper, I examine the effects of estate taxation on charitable
bequests using data from estate tax returns of decedents in 1992.  The results suggest that the estate
tax deduction is “budget” efficient.  The overall effects of the estate tax, however, are likely to be
modest as charitable bequests are wealth elastic.
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Charitable bequests represent an important source of philanthropic support, and represent
a significant portion of the overall charitable giving by the wealthy.  About $8 billion in
charitable bequests, for instance, were reported on the estate tax returns of decedents in 1992.
1 
This compares to about $21 billion in lifetime charitable contributions reported in 1992 on the
income tax returns of living households with comparable wealth.
2  While the latter outnumber
the estate tax filing population by 60 fold, their lifetime giving is less than three times the
transfers to charity at death.
3
While a small fraction of estates report such bequests, overall they are relatively more
generous than their living counterparts.  Indeed, to select sectors of the nonprofit world, these
bequests represent a significant source of funding.  The estates of 1,149 decedents alone, for
instance, contributed $260 million to the arts and humanities in 1992 (Eller, 1997, p. 58); an
amount equivalent to 75 percent of the combined federal budgets of the National Endowment for
the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities (Office of Management and Budget,
1994, Appendix 147).
The pattern of charitable bequests and the potential effects of the estate tax have
important implications for public policy.  Because charitable bequests are deductible in
computing the estate tax liability, estate taxation lowers the price of such transfers.  This
deduction is estimated to cost the federal government over $5 billion in foregone estate tax
revenues annually (OMB, 1998, p. 97).  An important question is whether the deductibility of
charitable bequests is “budget” efficient in that it stimulates charitable giving by more than the
revenue loss to the government.2
In this paper, I take a fresh look at the effects of the estate tax on charitable bequests and
explore its other determinants.  Specifically, I use data drawn from the estate tax returns of
decedents in 1992 with estate tax returns filed over the 1992 through 1994 years.  I also explore
issues related to identifying the estate tax price effects separately from those of wealth. 
Identification can be a serious problem in evaluating the effects of estate taxation especially as
only cross sectional data are available reflecting the uniqueness of death (Poterba, 1998).  In
addition, I also address the potential endogeneity of the tax price of bequests, which has been
traditionally overlooked in the literature.  Consistent with much of the literature, I find giving to
be highly responsive to taxes with a price elasticity in excess of one.  In addition, but in contrast
to the findings in the literature, I also find giving to be highly responsive to wealth with an
elasticity in excess of one as well.
2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON CHARITABLE BEQUESTS
A limited number of studies have examined the effects of estate taxes on charitable
bequests.  These studies have primarily resorted to estate tax records and, employing the first
dollar tax price, find that estate taxes are an important consideration in making bequests.  An
exception is Barthold and Plotnick (1984) who use probate records and find estate taxation to
have insignificant effects.   Table 1 provides a brief description of the data sources employed,
periods examined, and summary of the findings on the tax price effects.
McNees (1973) uses data from federal estate tax returns filed with the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) in 1957 and 1959.  Examining observations with positive bequests only, he
estimates linear and logarithmic equations and finds that taxes have a stimulative effect on3
charitable bequests.  Given the limited information reported, however, a measure of the price
elasticity cannot be obtained from the study.  McNees also finds that bequests rise with wealth
and tend to be lower for widowed decedents.
Also using the 1957-59 data, as well as 1969 estate tax returns, Boskin (1976) also finds
taxes to play an important role in determining bequests.  Boskin reports tax price elasticities that
range from -0.2 to -2.53, depending on the period examined and the size of the estate.  He also
reports bequests to rise with after-tax wealth (disposable estate), with estimated elasticities of 0.2
to 0.7, and are smallest for married individuals and those under the age of 65.
Barthold and Plotnick (1984) resort to Connecticut probate records of decedents in the
1930s and 1940s.  Defining wealth as total assets or gross estate, they find price elasticities not
significantly different from zero.  Feldstein (1977) employs pooled grouped data on bequests
classified by estate size, published by SOI, for the years 1948 through 1963.  The reported price
elasticities ranged from –4.0 to –0.1.
Clotfelter (1985) employs estate tax data for decedents in 1976 with returns filed in 1977. 
His data is based on a 20 percent random sub-sample of the IRS sample and excludes those with
wealth under $5,000.  Using a log-linear specification, he finds tax price elasticities of -1.67 and
-2.79, and wealth elasticities of 0.18 to 0.42, depending on whether wealth is measured before or
after taxes, respectively.  He also finds bequests to increase with age, and are greatest for the
never-married single and smallest for those married.
Employing estate tax returns for decedents in 1986 filed during 1986-1988, Joulfaian
(1991) also estimates a log-linear specification.  This study excludes estates of decedents age 30
and younger, and those with after-tax wealth under $5,000.  It introduces a number of4
refinements to the wealth measure, and finds a tax price elasticity of -3.0 and wealth elasticity of
0.23.
4
Finally, using data from a special study of estate decedents in 1982 with tax returns filed
in 1982 and 1983, Auten and Joulfaian (1996) report a price elasticity of -2.5 obtained from a
logarithmic specification. The data, in which the wealthy are over sampled, is a sub-sample of the
SOI file on decedents in 1982.  It is limited to estates of parents with assets in excess of
$300,000.
Differences in the findings in the literature can be attributed to differences in the periods
studied, the tax laws in effect, and the econometric specifications employed.  They may also
reflect differences in the computation of the tax price and after-tax wealth.  Changes in the tax
Code, in addition to differences in measuring wealth, and the size of estates examined, make it
very difficult to compare findings over time.
3 MODELING CHARITABLE BEQUESTS
A How Estate Taxes Affect  Giving
Individuals accumulate wealth for a variety of reasons.  The portion of wealth not
consumed during life is disposed of in one of two ways.  It is either bequeathed to heirs or
transferred to charity.  An individual’s objective is then to determine how to allocate this
terminal wealth between the two potential donees.  Bequests to heirs are potentially subject to the
estate tax, while transfers to charity are exempt rendering such bequests relatively less costly. 
Given wealth and the tax price of charitable bequests, the individual decides on the optimal
transfer.
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More formally, and in a very simple model, an individual's utility is determined by
bequests to heirs (B) and charitable bequests (CB), or
The individual maximizes his utility subject to a budget constraint which requires that
expenditures on charitable and non-charitable bequests not exceed the individual's after-tax
terminal wealth W, or:
where PCB denotes the tax price of charitable bequests.  At a tax rate of 0.55, it will cost the donor
$2.22 for every $1 in bequests to heirs, or 1/(1-e).  In contrast, bequests to charity are exempt
from taxation as they are deductible in computing the estate tax.  Normalizing on the price of
bequests to heirs, the price of giving $1 to charity is 0.45, or PCB=1-e.  If the heir is the spouse,
then PCB=1 as spousal bequests are fully deductible.
6
Solving for the first-order conditions, the individual sets the amounts of transfers to
charity at the point where his marginal rate of substitution between bequests to charity and
bequests to the heirs is equal to the (relative) price of charitable bequests,
In the absence of the estate tax, or in the case of  transfers to a spouse, PCB=1, charitable bequests
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consider the heirs’ consumption needs, or the psychic cost for having a charity chosen over them
(Wilhelm, 1996), among other factors.
The literature primarily employs a logarithmic demand function in modeling the
determinants of charitable bequests.  To empirically model these determinants, I estimate a
budget share model which is specified as:
While the data, as demonstrated below, provides stronger support for this rather flexible
specification, I also estimate a number of alternative equations.  The dependent variable in (4) is
defined as bequests, less the tax savings from the deduction, which is almost equivalent to
multiplying the price (P) by the amount of charitable bequests (CB), divided by after-tax wealth
(W).  In addition to price and wealth, I control for a number of variables (X) to capture taste
preferences.
BD a t a
To model the determinants of charitable bequests and the effects of estate taxation, I use
data prepared by the Statistics of Income (SOI) Division of the Internal Revenue Service.  The
data are drawn from the estate tax returns of decedents in 1992, with estate tax returns filed
during the years 1992 through 1994.  The data represent a stratified random sample where the
rich and the young are over represented; sampling rates of 100 percent apply to those with gross
estates of $5 million and over, and those under the age of 40.7
The sample is limited to estates with total assets over $600,000, the filing threshold in
1992, and excludes those with negative net worth.  Given the filing threshold, the individuals in
this sample are somewhat wealthier, in real terms, than those with gross estates over $300,000
examined in Auten and Joulfaian (1996), $60,000 in McNees (1973), Boskin (1976), and
Clotfelter (1985, p. 241), but comparable to those in Joulfaian (1991) using 1986 data and
Barthold and Plotnick (1984) using Connecticut data from the 1930s and 1940s.
Estate tax returns provide information on wealth and its disposition.  Information is
available on asset categories, debts, funeral expenses, and expenses of settling the estate such as
attorney fees and executor commissions.  They also provide information on charitable and
spousal transfers.  Demographic information is available on age, marital status, and gender.
1 The Tax Price
Statutory estate tax rates (e) ranged from 18 percent to 55 percent in 1992.  Column 1 of
Table 2 reports the tax rate schedule in effect in 1992.  This rate schedule applies to the taxable
estate, which is defined as assets held at death, less debts, estate expenses, spousal transfers, and
charitable bequests.  By virtue of the unified credit of $192,800, the marginal tax rate is reduced
to zero for taxable estates of up to $600,000, as shown in column 2 of Table 2.  This credit, along
with the progressive rate structure, is phased out for taxable estates between $10 and $21 million
($17 million after 1997), raising the marginal tax rate to 0.60 before it drops back to 0.55 beyond
this bubble range.
7
The estate tax also provides a credit for state death taxes.  The credit is limited to a
maximum of 16 percent of the federal taxable estate, which reduces the maximum federal tax8
rate to 0.39.   Because of this offset, the estate tax liability is computed in the absence of the
credit, which affects the computation of the tax price and after-tax wealth.  Essentially, the tax
rate can be viewed as a combination of federal and state tax rates with a maximum statutory
value of 0.55.
8  In an alternative set of estimates, state taxes and the federal credit are directly
considered, to the extent possible, in measuring price and wealth.  For the wealthiest estates, the
minimum price is 0.45, or one minus 0.55.
As stated earlier, the taxable estate is equal to the gross estate less debts, estate expenses,
spousal and charitable bequests.  The marginal tax rate is computed by adding $1,000 to
charitable bequests, tracing the change in taxable estate, and calculating the resulting change in
tax liability.  The marginal heir is assumed to be someone other than the spouse.  An implicit
assumption here is that taxes do not alter the choice between charitable gifts and spousal
bequests (relative price=1); there is no need to add the price relative to the spousal bequests as
well.  Because the tax rate is likely to be endogenous to giving, the first dollar tax price is used as
an instrument.  In computing this instrument, the tax rate is calculated by setting charitable
bequests to zero.
In the case of closely held businesses, the computation of the true estate tax can be
complicated.  In estates, where the share of the estate in the form of closely held businesses
exceeds 35 percent, the pro-rated tax may be deferred and paid in installments over a period of 15
years; only interest is paid in the first five years.
9  The interest rate on the tax attributable to the
first million in taxable estate is set at 4 percent.  I use a rate of 8 percent which is equivalent to a
two-year average rate.  Interest payments are deductible in computing the estate tax and require
the filing of an amended return annually.  In effect, this reduces the interest rate of 8 percent to9
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3.6 percent when the tax rate is 0.55; 4 percent to 1.8 percent for the tax on the first million.
10 
Using a discount rate of 8 percent, the deferral reduces the tax rate by some 30 percent (40
percent for the smaller estates).  Thus, the price of giving can be defined as a weighted average of
the price of bequeathing business and non-business assets.   More, specifically it is measured as:
where 2 is the fraction of wealth qualifying for the deferral, and * is the discounted value of
deferred taxes (about 0.7 when e=0.55).  This deferral benefit, however, affects only a small
number of estates; only 266 estates of decedents in the sample of 11,915 elected to defer taxes.
2 Terminal Wealth
Wealth is defined as total assets less debts and estate expenses and taxes.  Several
modifications are made to the reported value of total assets.  The market value of farms and other
small businesses eligible for special estate tax valuations is substituted for the estate tax value.
11 
Life insurance proceeds excluded from the estate, exempt from taxation but reported on the estate
tax return, are added back.  Certain estate expenses such as funeral expenses, attorney and
executive fees, and administration expenses reduce this measure of wealth.  It is further reduced
by the amount of the estate tax computed in the absence of charitable bequests.  This
"disposable" wealth represents the maximum amount that can be inherited by the heirs, including
spouse, consistent with the budget constraint in (2).10
3 Bequest Preferences
In addition to age and marital status, business ownership is employed as a proxy for
bequest preferences.  Entrepreneurs and farmers may have dynastic preferences and wish to pass
closely held business to the children.
4 Summary Statistics
The sample means for select variables are reported in Table 3.  The first column in Table
3 reports summary statistics for the entire sample of 11,915 estates.  On average, these estates
report disposable wealth of $2.9 million and bequeath $463,100 to charity, at a cost of $264,000
after accounting for its deductibility.  About 2,200 estates, or fewer than 18 percent report
charitable bequests.  The average age is 68 years, with 17 percent over the age of 85.  As for
marital status, 59 percent of the individuals are married, and 25 percent widowed, with the
remainder either single (never married) or divorced.  Business share of assets is 8.5 percent while
life insurance proceeds make-up 12.7 percent of wealth.  The average first dollar tax price is
0.76, or 0.77 using the last dollar tax rate.  Also reported are the price measures defined as 1-e,
ignoring the deferral of tax; the two sets of measures are fairly close reflecting the rarity of the
election of installment payments.
Table 4 provides details on the composition of charitable bequests.  Over half of those
reporting charitable bequests provide for transfers to educational (and medical) institutions, and
religious organizations.  Few give to the arts and foundations, and much fewer to social welfare
organizations.  On average, and given the limited number of categories, individuals make
bequests to about two types of charities.11
While few give to foundations, these organizations are on average the largest recipients
followed by educational/medical and other organizations.   About 40 percent of gifts are made to
foundations even though they account for less than 10 percent of the recipients.  In the case of the
wealthiest group, those with wealth in excess of $50 million, transfers to foundations account for
well over half the bequests to all organizations.  The least wealthy, on the other hand, give less to
foundations.  The reverse is observed in the case of giving to religious organizations; the least
wealthy bequeath about 32 percent of their transfers while the very wealthy provide less than one
percent.
Table 5A provides further detail on the attributes of the individuals in the sample.  Of the
sample of 11,915 estates, 202 report disposable wealth of less than half a million while 29 report
wealth in excess of $50 million.  The fraction making bequests rises with wealth and peaks at 55
percent for those in the top wealth category.
12  A similar pattern is also observed for the amount
bequeathed.
C Price Identification
A common problem encountered in studies of the effects of taxes on economic behavior
is how to identify the tax price effects separately from the effects of income (Feenberg, 1987). 
This problem arises because the marginal tax rate can be determined by other regressors, income
in particular, which confounds the measurement of tax effects.  At issue is whether the estimated
coefficient on the tax price truly captures the tax effects or does it also reflect the income effects
as well; this problem is especially onerous in the case of cross-sectional data.
In the case of charitable bequests, the computed tax rate may similarly capture the effects12
of the wealth of the decedent, since it is computed as a function of the taxable estate (Poterba,
1998).  Because the estate tax provides different treatments to different taxpayers, especially in
the presence of the unlimited marital deduction, however, the identification problem may not be
as severe as that encountered in the literature on the effects of income taxation on charitable
contributions.  Being married, however, does not only affect marginal tax rates, but may also
affect the propensity to give in other ways.  There is, for instance, potentially one additional heir. 
This requires that marital status be controlled for.  Other factors also aid in the identification
process.  These include the estate tax rate of 0.60 in the bubble range, where the tax rate first
increases and then decreases with wealth, the excluded life insurance proceeds, the deferral of
tax, and the exclusion due to the special use valuation.
A casual observation of columns 4, 5, and 7 of Table 5A suggests a weak correlation
between wealth and the tax price, especially in the case of after-tax wealth in excess of $2.5
million.   Also consider Tables 5B and 5C which provide tabulations on the attributes of the
estates similar to those reported in Table 5A but provided by marital status.  For comparable
wealth levels, the tax price varies considerably between married individuals (Table 5B) and those
not married (Table 5C).  For married individuals with wealth between $500,000 and $750,000
the tax price is 0.97 while it is 0.71 for those not married but with comparable wealth.  Moving
up the wealth cohorts, we continue to observe the same pattern of variations in the tax price




Column 2 of Table 3 reports mean values for select variables for the subsample of estates
reporting charitable bequests.  The conditional average bequest is $2.9 million with a disposable
wealth of $5.3.  The average age is 78 years, with 41 percent over the age of 85.  About 29
percent of the individuals are married, with 46 percent widowed, and 52 percent male.  Business
assets constitute 5.5 percent of wealth.  The average tax price is 0.55 (0.66 for last dollar).
Column 3 of Table 3 provides similar statistics on estates not reporting charitable
bequests.  The attributes of these estates are markedly distinct from those of givers.  These
individuals are less wealthy, younger, more likely to be married, and male.  They also have more
of their estates in the form of businesses.  Individuals with stronger bequest preferences, as
manifested by business ownership, seem less likely to give to charity.  More importantly, these
individuals face a lower tax price; the tax price is about 0.8 compared to 0.55 (0.65 in case of the
last dollar price) for donors.
Comparing the tabulations in Tables 5B and 5C also help clarify the role of taxes in
influencing charitable bequests.  In the case of two groups of individuals with the same wealth,
but one is married, we observe larger bequests reported by the estates facing a smaller tax price. 
For those with wealth of $10 to $20 million, married individuals face a price of 0.70 and
contribute $0.6 million (Table 5B), compared to their counterparts in Table 5C who face a price
of 0.45 and contribute an average of $11.9 million.
The wealthiest married individuals (wealth >$50 million), report mean wealth of $181
million and bequeath $23 million to charity, with an average ratio of such bequests to wealth of
6.4 percent.  In contrast, not married individuals with mean after-tax wealth of $116 million
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the amount given to charity rises with wealth.  The fraction giving also rises with wealth and
peaks at 80 percent, before it drops to 66.7 percent for the wealthiest group of not-married
individuals in Table 5C.
B Multivariate Estimates
While Table 3 shows that donors face a lower tax price, and Tables 5A through 5C
suggest that bequests are negatively associated with the tax price, I resort to multivariate analysis
to quantify this relationship and shed light on the other determinants of charitable bequests. 
Consistent with the literature on charitable bequests, the exogenous first dollar tax price is
initially employed, followed by the endogenous last dollar tax price.
Table 6 provides Tobit estimates of the budget share allocated to charitable bequests, as
specified in equation (4).  Beginning with wealth, and as reported in column 1, the estimated
coefficient is 0.06 with a standard error of 0.01.  Evaluated at mean values, it implies an elasticity
of bequests with respect to wealth of about 1.17, evaluated at the sample mean value of the
budget share.  The elasticity coefficient is computed as:
where, M(z) is the probability of reporting positive bequests.  This estimate is well above many
of the estimates in the current literature.
The never married singles, as well as those widowed or divorced, bequeath more than
their married counterparts.  This is in sharp contrast to the finding in the literature on lifetime
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married counterparts.  A similar pattern is also observed for giving in the year prior to the date of
death (Auten and Joulfaian, 1996).
Gender seems to have little effect on giving.  Bequests rise with age and are greatest for
those age 85 and over.  They decline with the share of business assets in the estate.  This is
consistent with the basic statistics reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3, and demonstrates that
when bequest preferences are strong individuals leave less to charity.
Consistent with much of the literature, the bequest tax price has a strong effect on
charitable bequests.  The estimated coefficient is -0.58 with a standard error of 0.03, which yields
an implied elasticity of –2.5, evaluated at the sample mean value of the budget share.  The
elasticity coefficient is computed as:
This estimate is well within the range of estimates reported in the literature.
14
While the first dollar tax price is exogenous, it is arguably not the theoretically correct
price.  The last dollar tax price is perhaps the theoretically correct measure but is endogenous to
the size of bequests.  In other words, while charitable bequests are influenced by the tax price, the
former can determine the latter as well, as these bequests reduce the size of the taxable estate. 
Because the two can be simultaneously determined, the estimates in column one of Table 6 are
replicated with the size of bequests and the tax price simultaneously estimated using FIML.
FIML Tobit estimates are reported in column two of Table 6 with the price equation
reported in Appendix 1.  The regressors for the latter include the first dollar tax price and the16
remaining regressors in Table 6.  As for the Tobit equation, the estimated coefficients on all the
regressors are of comparable magnitude to those reported earlier, with the exception of the tax
price.  The estimated tax price coefficient decreases, in absolute value, to -0.28 (S.E.= 0.03), and
the implied elasticity by about 30 percent to –1.7, down from -2.5 estimated earlier.  Combined,
the price and wealth elasticities suggest that a repeal of the estate tax would lead to a reduction of
about 12 percent in bequests, or 44 percent if only the deduction were to be disallowed.  These
represent about $1 billion and $4 billion in charitable bequests reported in 1992, respectively.
To highlight the contribution of the marital deduction to resolving the identification
problem, I split the sample into married and not married (widowed, never married single,
divorced and separated) groups, and reproduce the FIML estimates.  These are reported in
columns 3 and 4 of Table 6.  In the case of those married, the estimated coefficient on wealth is
not significantly different from zero.  In contrast, and in the case of those not married, the
estimated coefficient on the price is not significantly different from zero.
15
1 Traditional Specification
The specification employed above is significantly different from those employed in the
literature, both in using the expenditure share as the dependent variable and using the last dollar
price corrected for endogeneity.  Perhaps it would be informative to estimate the price elasticities
using the more restrictive log-linear specification commonly encountered in the literature.  Table
7 replicates the estimates of Table 6, where the dependent variable is replaced with the logarithm
of bequests.
The standard Tobit estimates from this constant elasticity specification are generally17
similar to those reported in column 1 of Table 6, except for the coefficients on wealth.  The
estimated elasticity of bequests with respect to wealth decreases to 0.25, a mere fraction of the
earlier estimate in Table 6.  Again, not married individuals, specially the never married singles,
bequeath more than their married counterparts.  Gender seems to have little effect on giving. 
Bequests rise with age and decline with the share of business assets in the estate.  The bequest
tax price continues to have a strong effect on charitable bequests with an implied elasticity is -
2.7, similar to the most recent findings in the literature.  This is close to the earlier estimate of -
2.5 in column 1 of Table 6.
FIML estimates reported in column 2 are similar to those reported in column 1.  The
wealth elasticity is 0.26, with a slightly smaller estimated price elasticity; -2.3 vs. -2.7.  These
estimated elasticities suggest that the repeal of the estate tax would lead to a reduction of 53
percent in charitable bequests; 60 percent if the deduction were to be disallowed.
As with the earlier estimates in Table 6, and in order to highlight the contribution of the
marital deduction, I split the sample into married and not married groups.  In the case of the
former, the wealth elasticity is close to zero (0.055) and the price elasticity is about one-half the
estimate in column 2.  In contrast, the wealth elasticity for the not-married group is 1.52, about 6
times the estimate in column 2.
16
The estimates from this specification, especially that of wealth, are at odds with those for
the budget share specification; the wealth elasticity parameter is much smaller (0.26 vs. 1.16),
and the price elasticity somewhat higher (-2.3 vs. -1.7).  To test the robustness of each of these
two specifications, I estimate separate equations, excluding price as a regressor,  for estates of
not-married decedents with pre-tax wealth over $21 million (n=97).  At this wealth levels, no18
variation in price should be observed (see column 2 of Table 5).  For the budget share
specification, the estimated wealth elasticity is 1.30, which is fairly close to the FIML estimate of
1.16 reported in Table 6.  On the other hand, the estimate for the log specification is 2.15, several
multiples of the supposedly constant elasticity estimate of 0.26 in Table 6; the budget share
specification yields more consistent estimates of wealth elasticities.
2 Alternative Treatment of Spousal Bequests
Thus far, an implicit assumption in the above estimates is that an individual transfers
some or all of his wealth to his wife at death, in preference over charity.  In doing so, he
relinquishes control over the final disposition of such transfers.  As an alternative, I relax this
assumption and assume that the deceased retains full control over his estate; all wealth is
ultimately transferred to other heirs, children in particular.  The individual, for instance, is certain
that all spousal bequests will be held to be transferred to the children by the surviving spouse. 
None of the proceeds are to be consumed by the spouse during her life or used to settle her estate
expenses at death.  Accordingly, both after-tax wealth and the tax price are computed by setting
the marital deduction to zero, with an allowance for an additional exemption of $600,000 at the
spouses death.  In the updated estimates of Table 6, summarized in panel (1) of Table 8, the
estimated coefficients on wealth become 0.140 (se=0.011) and 0.121 (se=0.006 ) respectively, for
implied elasticities of 1.42 and 1.39, slightly higher than those reported in Table 6.  The
respective estimated coefficients on price become -0.139 (se=0.037) and 0.036 (se=0.027), for
implied price elasticities of -1.42 and -0.89, little over one half the value reported earlier.
In the above scenario, by doing away with the marital deduction, we lose a primary source19
of identification and have little independent variation in the tax price.
17  To tackle this problem, I
modify the measures of price and wealth by incorporating the effects of state taxes.  For each
individual I calculate the sum of federal and state taxes, net of the federal credit.  I make two
critical assumptions.  First, I assume that all the heirs are children.
18  I further assume that all
wealth is located in the state of residence.  I exclude observations where the residence is in a
jurisdiction outside the 50 states and the District of Columbia, as well as the never-married single
as they are unlikely to have children.  As shown in panel (2) of Table 8, the estimated
coefficients on wealth become 0.136 (se=0.01) and 0.114 (se=0.006), for implied elasticities of
1.46 and 1.42.  The estimated coefficients on price are -0.078 (se=0.034) and 0.047 (se=0.024),
with implied elasticity coefficients of -1.26 and -0.83.  These are almost identical to the estimates
in panel (1).  This outcome, however, should net be surprising as there is generally little
independent variation in the combined federal and state tax rates as well.
19
Next, I exclude observations with pre-tax wealth under $5 million which reduces the
sample size to 2070 observations.  At this range, the maximum statutory federal estate tax rate of
55 percent applies.  Except for the bubble range at taxable estates between $10 and $21 million
where the federal rate is 0.60, observed variations in the tax price are primarily explained by
variations in state tax rates.
20  As shown in panel (3) of Table 8, the estimated wealth elasticities
for this subsample of the wealthiest individuals are 1.57 and 1.55, respectively, and the price
elasticities are -2.28 and -1.88.  These are quite similar to those in the second column of Table 6,
even though the marital deduction is assumed away.
Notwithstanding the identification problem, the underlying assumption for doing away
with the marital deduction is inherently unrealistic.  Many individuals leave much of their estates20
to their spouses because they are concerned about their consumption needs and well being
(altruism) or simply because they want to share their wealth with them (joy of giving).  In
addition, the spouse may very well spend some if not all the transferred wealth.  In some
instances, however, individuals may place constraints and attempt, not always successfully, to
control how much the surviving spouse may consume out of transferred wealth.  With some or all
of the spousal bequests, they may set up a trust, such as a QTIP trust which qualifies for the
marital deduction, and designate the children as the trust beneficiaries.
21  Trust restrictions dictate
how much of the trust the spouse may tap into, and unspent amounts are then transferred to the
heirs at the spouse’s death.  Again, given the lack of information, I assume all the assets held in a
QTIP are planned to pass to the heirs and none are to be consumed by the spouse; the disposition
of non-QTIP transfers is left to the spouse.  I reduce the reported spousal bequests by the amount
set aside in a QTIP, adjust the reported marital deduction, and re-estimate the specification in
Table 6.  Under this scenario, and as reported in panel (4) of Table 8, the estimated coefficients
on wealth become 0.075 (se=0.009) and 0.073 (se=0.006), respectively, for implied elasticity
coefficients of 1.21 and 1.19.  The respective estimated coefficients on price are estimated at -
0.46 (se=0.03) and -0.21 (se=0.03).  The implied price elasticities become -2.26 and -1.57.  Both
wealth and price elasticities are almost identical to the FIML estimates reported in Table 6.
The estimates of panel (4) are unaffected by the inclusion of state taxes.  The reported
price and wealth elasticities reported in panel (5) are virtually identical to those observed earlier. 
As with panel (3), the estimated effects become larger when the observations are limited to those
with wealth over $5 million.  The estimated Tobit price and wealth elasticities, reported in panel
(6), are -2.9 and 1.41, and -2.5 and 1.4 for FIML, respectively.21
In contrast to the findings in the literature, the estimated wealth elasticities are well in
excess of one; charitable giving is more likely to be a superior good.  These results are invariant
to competing assumptions about the treatment of spousal bequests and their ultimate disposal. 
While the price elasticity estimates are somewhat sensitive to the latter, they are also generally in
excess of one.  This should not be surprising as there are abundant substitutes to charitable
bequests, namely children and other heirs.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper explores the role of estate taxation in determining charitable bequests.  It
employs a large sample of estate tax returns of decedents in 1992 and takes a fresh look at the
evidence on charitable bequests.  The paper also explores issues related to price identification
and its endogeneity to bequests, which are traditionally ignored in the literature.
Results from a number of specifications suggest that the estate tax deduction is an
important consideration in determining charitable bequests.  The deductibility of bequests has a
significant effect on such transfers and seems to be “budget” efficient.  Overall, however, the
estate tax has a modest effect on giving; the tax reduces terminal wealth which mitigates some of
stimulative effect of the price reduction.  In the absence of the estate tax, the above findings
suggest that charitable bequests may decline by about 12 percent.
These bequests are found to increase with wealth and age, and decline with the share of
business assets in the estate.  The paper also finds that married individuals give the least.  In
contrast, the literature on lifetime contributions suggests that married individuals give more to
charity than their non-married counterparts, even shortly before the date of death.  Future22
research should focus on this divergence in giving patterns.
In addition to its contribution to the nonprofit sector, charitable bequests may shed light
on the savings motives of the wealthy; these transfers are perhaps inconsistent with the view that
the bequest motive explains the size of the wealth amassed by the very wealthy.  This gives more
credence to the view that the wealthy derive utility from holding wealth during life.  Future
research should also explore the link between charitable bequests and savings motives.23
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Summary of the Findings on the Effect of Estate Taxes on Charitable Bequests
Study Data Sources Estimated Price Elasticities
(Specification)
McNees (1973) Federal estate tax returns filed in 1957 and 1959 Not reported; finds taxes to be a
significant factor (linear and logarithmic)
Boskin (1976) Federal estate tax returns filed in 1957 and 1959 -0.94 to -1.8* (linear)
Federal estate tax returns filed in 1969 -0.2 to -2.53* (linear)
Feldstein (1977) Aggregate Federal estate tax data pooled for estate
tax returns filed in 1948 through 1963.
-4.0 to -0.1 (varies)
Barthold and Plotnick (1984) Connecticut probate records, 1930s and 1940s No effect (logarithmic)
Clotfelter (1985) Federal estate tax returns of decedents in 1976
filed in 1977
-2.79 to -1.67 (logarithmic)




Auten and Joulfaian (1996) Federal estate tax returns for decedents in 1982
filed during 1982-83
-2.5 (logarithmic)
* Evaluated at mean values.Table 2





Tax Rates after Unified
Credit and Phase-outs
From To
0 10 0.18 0.00
10 20 0.20 0.00
20 40 0.22 0.00
40 60 0.24 0.00
60 80 0.26 0.00
80 100 0.28 0.00
100 150 0.30 0.00
150 250 0.32 0.00
250 500 0.34 0.00
500 600 0.37 0.00
600 750 0.37 0.37
750 1,000 0.39 0.39
1,000 1,250 0.41 0.41
1,250 1,500 0.43 0.43
1,500 2,000 0.45 0.45
2,000 2,500 0.49 0.49
2,500 3,000 0.53 0.53
3,000 10,000 0.55 0.55
10,000 21,040* 0.55 0.60
21,040* and over 0.55 0.55
* Changed to $17,184,000 after 1997.Table 3







Charitable Bequests ($millions) 0.4631 2.6428 0.0000
Charitable Bequests, Share of Wealth 3.56% 20.29% 0.00%
Disposable Wealth ($millions) 2.9060 5.2897 2.3995
Before Tax Wealth ($millions) 3.7964 8.3323 2.8326
Married 59.27% 28.64% 65.78%
Widowed 24.53% 46.55% 19.85%
Single, never married 9.48% 17.15% 7.85%
Divorced or Separated 6.72% 7.66% 6.52%
Male 66.15% 51.72% 69.22%
Age 67.77 78.17 65.56
Age under 45 0.08% 0.04% 0.09%
  45 under 55 13.44% 5.08% 15.21%
  55 under 65 20.85% 9.39% 23.28%
  65 under 75 23.01% 15.04% 24.71%
  75 under 85 17.35% 25.57% 15.60%
  85 and over 17.36% 41.38% 12.26%
Business Share of Estate 8.50% 5.50% 9.13%
Insurance Share of Estate 12.72% 4.03% 14.56%
Price, First $ 0.7553 0.5520 0.7985
Price, Last $ 0.7743 0.6604 0.7985
Price, First $ (1-e) 0.7531 0.5501 0.7962
Price, Last $ (1-e) 0.7721 0.6584 0.7962
Observations 11,915 2,088 9,827Table 4
Charitable Bequests by Type
After-Tax Wealth All Arts Education/
Medical
Foundations Religious Welfare Other Mean
Number of
Categories Observations with Charitable Bequest
******** 750,000 299 32 148 5 184 13 120 1.7
750,000 1,000,000 273 23 149 5 134 17 136 1.7
1,000,000 2,500,000 582 80 344 18 305 26 241 1.7
2,500,000 5,000,000 503 80 312 48 245 21 245 1.9
5,000,000 10,000,000 280 47 156 59 113 17 129 1.9
10,000,000 20,000,000 83 18 44 21 29 3 33 1.8
20,000,000 50,000,000 52 12 26 26 14 0 22 1.9
50,000,000 ******** 16 5 5 9 4 0 10 2.1
TOTAL 2,088 297 1,184 191 1,028 97 936 1.8
Mean Bequest Distribution of Charitable Bequests
******** 750,000 143,698 3.39% 40.58% 3.81% 31.64% 0.76% 19.82%
750,000 1,000,000 263,480 3.45% 46.08% 2.55% 13.90% 6.72% 27.29%
1,000,000 2,500,000 434,200 3.29% 43.01% 6.82% 17.35% 0.98% 28.55%
2,500,000 5,000,000 1,572,270 3.59% 34.49% 19.95% 10.85% 0.57% 30.54%
5,000,000 10,000,000 2,715,250 2.93% 37.51% 34.14% 5.34% 1.16% 18.92%
10,000,000 20,000,000 8,717,650 4.16% 36.84% 30.48% 6.96% 0.26% 21.29%
20,000,000 50,000,000 19,336,240 8.11% 20.54% 51.12% 0.48% 0.00% 19.76%
50,000,000 ******** 116,899,030 1.32% 4.23% 50.65% 0.26% 0.00% 43.54%
TOTAL 2,642,790 3.61% 23.01% 38.42% 4.60% 0.42% 29.95%Table 5A
























******** $500,000 202 12 5.9 99 99 5 391 1.1
500,000 750,000 2,378 287 12.1 82 84 18 647 2.3
750,000 1,000,000 1,949 273 14.0 79 80 37 865 3.2
1,000,000 2,500,000 4,147 582 14.0 77 78 61 1,550 2.4
2,500,000 5,000,000 1,862 503 27.0 66 68 425 3,437 5.9
5,000,000 10,000,000 942 280 29.7 67 70 807 6,746 5.4
10,000,000 20,000,000 282 83 29.4 66 69 2,566 13,431 8.3
20,000,000 50,000,000 124 52 41.9 61 64 8,109 29,141 11.2
50,000,000 ******** 29 16 55.2 55 58 64,496 163,460 18.5
TOTAL 11,915 2,088 17.5 76 77 463 2,906 3.6
Note:  Wealth is defined as net worth less estate expenses and estate taxes computed in the absence of charitable bequests, plus
excluded life insurance proceeds.  The ratio of bequests to wealth is computed after reducing bequests by the tax savings from the
deduction, i.e., PCB CB/W.  All means are return weighted.Table 5B
























******** $500,000 98 1 1.0 99 99 0 388 0.0
500,000 750,000 1,041 29 2.8 97 97 1 651 0.1
750,000 1,000,000 1,045 53 5.1 95 95 1 868 0.1
1,000,000 2,500,000 2,715 140 5.2 90 91 6 1,562 0.3
2,500,000 5,000,000 1,110 154 13.9 79 81 89 3,461 1.3
5,000,000 10,000,000 708 139 19.6 75 77 176 6,794 1.2
10,000,000 20,000,000 232 44 19.0 70 73 552 13,434 1.8
20,000,000 50,000,000 93 28 30.1 66 69 1,585 28,324 2.3
50,000,000 ******** 20 10 50.0 59 62 23,174 181,628 6.4
TOTAL 7,062 598 8.5 87 88 139 3,384 0.6
Note:  Wealth is defined as net worth less estate expenses and estate taxes computed in the absence of charitable bequests, plus
excluded life insurance proceeds.  The ratio of bequests to wealth is computed after reducing bequests by the tax savings from the
deduction, i.e., PCB CB/W.  All means are return weighted.Table 5C
























******** $500,000 104 11 10.6 99 99 9 394 2.2
500,000 750,000 1,337 258 19.3 71 73 31 644 4.1
750,000 1,000,000 904 220 24.3 60 63 78 861 6.8
1,000,000 2,500,000 1,432 442 30.9 52 55 165 1,526 6.5
2,500,000 5,000,000 752 349 46.4 46 50 920 3,402 12.6
5,000,000 10,000,000 234 141 60.3 42 47 2,718 6,602 18.1
10,000,000 20,000,000 50 39 78.0 46 52 11,912 13,419 38.7
20,000,000 50,000,000 31 24 77.4 46 49 27,679 31,589 37.8
50,000,000 ******** 9 6 66.7 48 48 156,323 123,086 45.5
TOTAL 4,853 1,490 30.7 58 61 935 2,210 7.9
Note:  Wealth is defined as net worth less estate expenses and estate taxes computed in the absence of charitable bequests, plus
excluded life insurance proceeds.  The ratio of bequests to wealth is computed after reducing bequests by the tax savings from the
deduction, i.e., PCB CB/W.  All means are return weighted.
** Includes never married singles, widowed, and divorced individuals.Table 6
Estimates of Charitable Bequests/Wealth








Constant -1.4741 0.1230 -1.2558 0.0858 -0.3102 0.0747 -2.0631 0.1377
ln Tax Price -0.5495 0.0334 -0.2795 0.0308 -0.3019 0.0202 0.0694 0.0599
ln Disposable Wealth 0.0612 0.0086 0.0641 0.0064 0.0050 0.0053 0.1445 0.0114
Business Share of Estate -0.1621 0.0396 -0.1229 0.0270 -0.0344 0.0199 -0.2195 0.0431
Male -0.0259 0.0135 -0.0188 0.0088 0.0018 0.0102 -0.0235 0.0113
Age under 45 -0.3106 0.0314 -0.2016 0.0198 -0.0853 0.0209 0.1679 0.0148
  45 under 55 -0.2633 0.0269 -0.1724 0.0181 -0.1038 0.0178 0.0506 0.0189
  55 under 65 -0.2484 0.0216 -0.1730 0.0146 -0.1163 0.0139 -0.2333 0.0266
  65 under 75 -0.2083 0.0184 -0.1501 0.0122 -0.1020 0.0124 -0.1877 0.0257
  75 under 85 -0.0894 0.0163 -0.0697 0.0107 -0.0351 0.0105 -0.1570 0.0202
Widowed 0.1112 0.0190 0.1280 0.0133 -- -- -- --
Single, never married 0.3629 0.0222 0.2993 0.0139 -- -- -0.1228 0.0165
Divorced/Separated 0.1812 0.0257 0.1754 0.0168 -- -- -0.0670 0.0139
North 0.0326 0.0172 0.0357 0.0115 0.0188 0.0124 0.0258 0.0151
Midwest 0.0658 0.0181 0.0433 0.0121 0.0264 0.0130 0.0388 0.0158
South 0.0223 0.0167 0.0144 0.0111 0.0209 0.0116 0.0046 0.0146
Sigma 0.4014 0.0068 1.5846 0.0367 0.1401 0.0024 0.2165 0.0035
Observations 11,915 11,915 7,062 4,853
Wealth Elasticity 1.1652 1.1602 1.0263 1.5453
Price Elasticity -2.4829 -1.6982 -2.5750 -0.7382Table 7
Estimates of ln Charitable Bequests









Constant -48.2400 4.0537 -46.0750 4.4260 -38.8780 7.1917 -69.7910 7.6419
ln Tax Price -22.1290 1.1017 -19.2480 1.8107 -26.5560 4.3677 -3.5520 2.1108
ln Disposable Wealth 2.0581 0.2819 2.1708 0.2848 1.3090 0.4226 4.6650 0.5685
Business Share of Estate -5.3669 1.2923 -4.9192 1.2364 -4.5337 1.9872 -7.9390 1.8386
Male -0.7369 0.4478 -0.6918 0.4093 -0.0811 0.8111 -1.0666 0.4760
Age under 45 -10.2170 1.0324 -9.1168 1.1090 -7.3034 2.0547 5.7403 0.8042
  45 under 55 -9.0228 0.8802 -8.1847 0.9928 -8.0630 1.7902 1.5937 0.7509
  55 under 65 -9.0044 0.7128 -8.4779 0.8934 -9.2493 1.7845 -9.6385 1.3408
  65 under 75 -7.6586 0.6113 -7.3788 0.7834 -7.5896 1.5851 -8.0621 1.2462
  75 under 85 -3.1104 0.5460 -3.1711 0.5590 -2.7477 1.1078 -6.9833 1.0436
Widowed 1.7403 0.6272 1.7864 0.5660 -- -- -- --
Single, never married 8.9520 0.7412 8.3233 0.7978 -- -- -6.3600 0.8809
Divorced/Separated 4.0804 0.8528 3.8806 0.7739 -- -- -3.0711 0.6408
North 1.6359 0.5698 1.7707 0.5403 2.0487 1.1024 1.5811 0.6223
Midwest 2.3919 0.6014 2.1765 0.5717 3.2280 1.1734 1.4706 0.6645
South 0.9976 0.5524 0.9545 0.4979 2.1021 1.0163 0.3631 0.5772
Sigma 13.7070 0.2557 11.4150 0.6956 12.4690 1.6275 10.7930 0.7718
Observations 11,915 11,915 7,062 4,853
Wealth Elasticity 0.2507 0.2641 0.0556 1.5186
Price Elasticity -2.6959 -2.3417 -1.1276 -1.1563Table 8
Tobit Estimates for Charitable Bequests/Wealth Using Alternative Treatments of Spousal Bequests
Tobit
ln Wealth ln Price
Coefficient Standard Error Elasticity Coefficient Standard Error Elasticity
1.  Set Marital deduction=0 (n=11,915) *
Standard 0.1397 0.0107 1.4194 -0.1391 0.0372 -1.4175
FIML 0.1212 0.0061 1.3904 0.0356 0.0265 -0.8854
2.  Plus, Account for State Taxes, Exclude Never-Married Singles (n=10,758)
Standard 0.1361 0.0104 1.4631 -0.0775 0.0337 -1.2638
FIML 0.1143 0.0055 1.4164 0.0467 0.0235 -0.8297
3.  Plus, Exclude Wealth<$5 Million (n=2,070) ***
Standard 0.1489 0.0165 1.5660 -0.3373 0.1384 -2.2824
FIML 0.1279 0.0136 1.5521 -0.2047 0.1287 -1.8836
4.  Reduce Marital Deduction by QTIP Trust (n=11,915) **
Standard 0.0749 0.0089 1.2071 -0.4556 0.0325 -2.2594
FIML 0.0731 0.0064 1.1949 -0.2133 0.0292 -1.5684
5.  Plus, Account for State Taxes, Exclude Never-Married Singles (n=10,758)
Standard 0.0743 0.0084 1.2384 -0.3556 0.0286 -2.1416
FIML 0.0667 0.0056 1.2124 -0.1730 0.0245 -1.5509
6.  Plus, Exclude Wealth<$5 Million (n=2,070) ***
Standard 0.1169 0.0157 1.4133 -0.5370 0.0578 -2.8991
FIML 0.1055 0.0153 1.3948 -0.4141 0.0702 -2.5494
* Surviving spouse consumption=0; spouse has no control over ultimate disposal of bequests from decedent.
** Surviving spouse consumption of QTIP trust =0; spouse has control over ultimate disposal of non-QTIP bequests.
*** Variations in price are primarily explained by variations in state tax rates.Appendix 1
Equation for the Last Dollar Tax Price
Variables Coefficient Standard Error
Constant -0.0022 0.0255
ln Tax Price 0.9369 0.0108
ln Disposable Wealth 0.0025 0.0020
Business Share of Estate -0.0098 0.0075
Male -0.0041 0.0024
Age under 45 -0.0395 0.0062
  45 under 55 -0.0328 0.0058
  55 under 65 -0.0312 0.0043
  65 under 75 -0.0301 0.0035
  75 under 85 -0.0194 0.0027
Widowed -0.0141 0.0038







* , where 1 and 2 refer to the bequest and tax price equations, respectively.  ψσ σ = 12 / 2
2
Based on the significance of the estimate, the null hypothesis that the error terms are not
correlated is rejected.